Input Context Data</summary>

Prior Task Context

Input File Context

/home/andrew/code/Science/post_data/projects/2026-02-23-DRM/content.md

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**Summary of Changes:**
## Core Cryptographic Requirements
To address the challenges of secure content distribution, the proposed protocol must satisfy several fundamental cryptographic requirements:
1.  **One Ciphertext, Many Keys:** The system must support a model where a single encrypted payload can be decrypted by an arbitrary number of authorized recipients. Each recipient possesses a unique decryption key, avoiding the security risks associated with shared group keys.
2.  **Non-Delegation (Leaf-Only Keys):** Decryption keys must be non-delegatable. This ensures that a key is tied to a specific "leaf" node in the distribution hierarchy. Recipients should not be able to derive or share functional sub-keys without exposing their own primary credentials.
3.  **Forensic Accountability:** In the event of unauthorized plaintext leakage, the system must provide a mechanism for forensic tracing. By analyzing the leaked content or the decryption process, it should be possible to uniquely i

> _... (truncated for display, 10976 characters omitted)_

</details>

Use Cases & Actors

Sovereign Accountable Content Distribution Protocol (SACDP)

Use Case Documentation

This document outlines the functional requirements and user interactions for the SACDP system, focusing on the lifecycle of secure content distribution, identity-bound decryption, and forensic accountability.

1. Actor Identification

2. Use Case Catalog

UC-101: Content Packaging and Distribution

Primary Actor: Content Creator Preconditions:

• Content Creator has a valid Public Parameter set from the Trust Authority.
• Raw media content is available for processing.

Main Success Scenario:

1. Content Creator selects the raw media file.
2. System performs a transform-domain analysis (e.g., DCT/MDCT) to identify optimal perturbation points for fingerprinting.
3. System encrypts the media using Lattice-based Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) parameters.
4. System generates a distribution manifest containing the Public Parameters and the encrypted blob.
5. Content Creator uploads the encrypted blob to the Storage Provider.
6. Content Creator publishes the manifest to the distribution channel.

Alternative Flows:

• A1: Optimization Failure: If the media format is unsupported for transform-domain analysis, the system falls back to a generic block-level encryption (forensic tracing resolution may be reduced).

Postconditions:

• Encrypted content is available for authorized recipients.
• The content is prepared for “Emergent Fingerprinting” during decryption.

Business Rules:

• BR-101: Encryption must utilize LWE (Learning With Errors) primitives to ensure post-quantum resistance.
• BR-102: A single ciphertext must be decryptable by multiple unique keys (One-to-Many).

UC-102: Identity-Bound Key Issuance

Primary Actor: Recipient (Leaf Node) Preconditions:

• Recipient has a verified identity (e.g., DID, Public Key, or Email).
• Trust Authority is online and operational.

Main Success Scenario:

1. Recipient submits a request for a decryption key, providing their Identity String ($ID_u$).
2. Trust Authority validates the Recipient’s authorization.
3. Trust Authority uses the Master Secret Key (MSK) to derive a Functional Encryption (FE) key $SK_{ID}$ bound to the Recipient’s identity.
4. System embeds Traitor Tracing (TT) components (Boneh-Shaw codes) into the key structure.
5. Recipient receives and securely stores the non-delegatable key.

Alternative Flows:

• A1: Authorization Denied: If the Recipient is not authorized, the TA rejects the request and logs the attempt.

Postconditions:

• Recipient possesses a unique key that cannot be shared without exposing their identity.

Business Rules:

• BR-103: Keys must be “Leaf-Only”; recipients cannot derive sub-keys for others.
• BR-104: Key generation must be computationally efficient but cryptographically bound to the specific $ID_u$.

UC-103: Content Decryption and Consumption

Primary Actor: Recipient (Leaf Node) Preconditions:

• Recipient possesses a valid $SK_{ID}$.
• Recipient has downloaded the encrypted content blob.

Main Success Scenario:

1. Recipient initiates the decryption process using the SACDP client.
2. The decryption algorithm applies the $SK_{ID}$ to the ciphertext.
3. Emergent Fingerprinting: During the mathematical transformation of decryption, the specific properties of $SK_{ID}$ introduce identity-bound, transform-domain perturbations into the media signal.
4. The system outputs the plaintext media for immediate playback/viewing.
5. The perturbations remain imperceptible to the human eye/ear but are mathematically detectable.

Alternative Flows:

• A1: Key Mismatch: If the key does not match the content’s public parameters, decryption fails.

Postconditions:

• Recipient consumes the content.
• The consumed content is uniquely fingerprinted to that Recipient.

Business Rules:

• BR-105: Decryption must maintain perceptual transparency (no visible/audible artifacts).
• BR-106: The fingerprinting must be “emergent”—it is a byproduct of the decryption math, not a separate post-processing step.

UC-104: Forensic Trace Analysis

Primary Actor: Forensic Auditor Preconditions:

• A leaked plaintext version of the content has been discovered.
• Auditor has access to the original Public Parameters and the Traitor Tracing database.

Main Success Scenario:

1. Auditor inputs the leaked media file into the Forensic Analysis Tool.
2. System extracts the transform-domain perturbations (the “Emergent Fingerprint”).
3. System compares the extracted fingerprint against the Boneh-Shaw codebook and the IBE identity mappings.
4. System identifies the specific $SK_{ID}$ (and thus the Recipient) used to generate the leak.
5. Auditor generates a cryptographic proof of the leak’s origin.

Alternative Flows:

• A1: Collusion Attack: If multiple users combined their content to mask fingerprints, the system utilizes the Traitor Tracing (TT) logic to identify at least one of the contributors.

Postconditions:

• The source of the unauthorized distribution is identified with high mathematical certainty.

Business Rules:

• BR-107: The system must be resilient against collusion attacks involving up to $k$ users.
• BR-108: Trace results must be verifiable by third parties without exposing the Master Secret Key.

3. Use Case Diagram

graph LR
    subgraph Actors
        CC[Content Creator]
        RN[Recipient / Leaf Node]
        FA[Forensic Auditor]
        TA[Trust Authority]
    end

    subgraph SACDP_System
        UC101((UC-101: Content Packaging))
        UC102((UC-102: Key Issuance))
        UC103((UC-103: Decryption & Consumption))
        UC104((UC-104: Forensic Trace Analysis))
    end

    subgraph External
        SP[Storage Provider]
    end

    CC --> UC101
    UC101 -.-> SP
    
    RN --> UC102
    TA --> UC102
    
    RN --> UC103
    SP -.-> UC103
    
    FA --> UC104
    UC104 -.-> TA

4. Actor-Use Case Matrix

Legend:

• P: Primary Actor (Initiates the action)
• S: Supporting Actor (Provides necessary services/data)
• I: Informed Actor (Receives notifications or results)

5. Traceability and Acceptance Criteria

Requirements Specification

Sovereign Accountable Content Distribution Protocol (SACDP)

Requirements Documentation

This document outlines the functional and non-functional requirements for the SACDP, a post-quantum cryptographic framework designed for secure, accountable content distribution.

1. Functional Requirements (FR)

The functional requirements focus on the core cryptographic operations: identity-bound key generation, emergent fingerprinting during decryption, and forensic tracing.

2. Non-Functional Requirements (NFR)

2.1 Performance

• NFR-PER-01: Decryption latency for a 4K video stream must not exceed 15ms per frame on standard consumer hardware (AVX-512/GPU accelerated).
• NFR-PER-02: Forensic analysis of a 30-second media clip must complete within 300 seconds on a standard workstation.

2.2 Scalability

• NFR-SCA-01: The system must support the issuance of up to $2^{64}$ unique identity-bound keys without key-space collisions.
• NFR-SCA-02: Ciphertext size overhead compared to raw encrypted data must not exceed 5%.

2.3 Security

• NFR-SEC-01 (Post-Quantum): Must provide a minimum of 128-bit security against both classical and quantum algorithms (Shor’s/Grover’s).
• NFR-SEC-02 (Non-Delegation): The cost of extracting a functional “clean” decryption key from an identity-bound key must be computationally equivalent to solving the underlying LWE problem.
• NFR-SEC-03 (Tamper Resistance): Any attempt to strip the emergent fingerprint must result in significant degradation of media quality (PSNR < 20dB).

2.4 Reliability

• NFR-REL-01: Key generation must have 99.99% availability for content creators.
• NFR-REL-02: The system must provide graceful degradation; if the fingerprinting module fails, the decryption must fail (Fail-Closed).

2.5 Usability & Maintainability

• NFR-MAI-01: The codebase must maintain > 80% unit test coverage for cryptographic primitives.
• NFR-USA-01: The decryption SDK must provide a standard PKCS#11 or KMIP-compliant interface for integration into existing media players.

3. Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM)

This matrix ensures that every use case is addressed by a requirement and verified by a test case.

4. Requirements Dependency Diagram

The following diagram illustrates the logical flow and dependencies between the functional and non-functional requirements.

graph TD
    %% Functional Requirements
    subgraph "Core Cryptography"
        FR401[FR-401: Post-Quantum Foundation] --> FR101[FR-101: Identity-Bound Key Gen]
        FR101 --> FR102[FR-102: Multi-Recipient Ciphertext]
    end

    subgraph "Decryption & Fingerprinting"
        FR102 --> FR201[FR-201: Emergent Fingerprinting]
        FR201 --> FR202[FR-202: Perceptual Transparency]
        FR201 --> FR501[FR-501: Offline Decryption]
    end

    subgraph "Forensics"
        FR201 --> FR301[FR-301: Forensic Traceability]
        FR301 --> FR302[FR-302: Collusion Resistance]
    end

    %% Non-Functional Dependencies
    NFR_SEC[NFR-SEC-01: PQ Security] -.-> FR401
    NFR_PER[NFR-PER-01: Decryption Latency] -.-> FR201
    NFR_SCA[NFR-SCA-01: Scalability] -.-> FR101

    %% Styling
    style FR401 fill:#f9f,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
    style FR201 fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
    style FR301 fill:#bfb,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

5. Detailed Acceptance Criteria (Examples)

AC-FR-201 (Emergent Fingerprinting)

1. Input: Encrypted media file, Identity-Bound Key $SK_{ID}$.
2. Process: Execute decryption algorithm $Dec(C, SK_{ID})$.
3. Output: Plaintext media $M’$.
4. Verification:
   • $M’$ must contain a bit-pattern $B$ embedded in the DCT coefficients.
   • $B$ must be mathematically derivable from $ID$ using the public tracing key.
   • The embedding must be inseparable from the decryption math (i.e., skipping the embedding skips the decryption).

AC-FR-301 (Forensic Traceability)

1. Input: A 10-second snippet of leaked video $M_{leak}$.
2. Process: Run sacdp-trace --input M_leak --params lattice_config.json.
3. Output: Identity $ID_{source}$.
4. Verification:
   • The output $ID_{source}$ must match the ID of the key used to generate the leak.
   • The False Positive Rate (FPR) must be $< 10^{-6}$ across 1,000 simulated leak trials.

System Architecture

Sovereign Accountable Content Distribution Protocol (SACDP) Architecture Documentation

1. System Context Diagram (C4 Level 1)

The SACDP provides a decentralized framework for secure content distribution, moving away from centralized DRM servers toward a model of cryptographic accountability.

graph TB
    subgraph SACDP_System [Sovereign Accountable Content Distribution Protocol]
        Core[Protocol Core: IBE, TT, & FE]
    end

    CC[Content Creator] -- "Packages content & issues keys" --> Core
    RN[Recipient / Leaf Node] -- "Requests & decrypts content" --> Core
    FA[Forensic Auditor] -- "Analyzes leaked content" --> Core

    Core -- "Stores encrypted blobs" --> DS[Distributed Storage: IPFS/S3]
    Core -- "Verifies identity" --> IDP[Identity Providers: DID/Web3]
    Core -- "Logs public parameters" --> BC[Public Ledger/Blockchain]

    style SACDP_System fill:#f9f,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

Context Descriptions

| Actor/System | Description | | :— | :— | | Content Creator | The entity that encrypts media using the SACDP protocol and manages the Master Secret Key (MSK) for a specific content library. | | Recipient (Leaf Node) | The end-user who holds a unique, non-delegatable decryption key tied to their identity. | | Forensic Auditor | A specialized entity that uses the Traitor Tracing (TT) module to identify the source of leaked plaintext. | | Distributed Storage | External infrastructure used to host the large encrypted media payloads (e.g., IPFS, Arweave, or traditional S3). | | Identity Provider | External systems (Decentralized Identifiers) used to bind cryptographic keys to real-world or pseudonymous identities. |

2. Container Diagram (C4 Level 2)

The system is decomposed into functional containers that handle key generation, content transformation, and forensic analysis.

graph TB
    subgraph Client_Side [Recipient Environment]
        RC[Recipient Client Library<br/>WASM/Native]
        MP[Media Player / Consumer]
    end

    subgraph Creator_Infrastructure [Creator Environment]
        KMS[Key Management Service<br/>Lattice-based IBE]
        CP[Content Packager<br/>Lattice Encryption + DCT]
    end

    subgraph Audit_Environment [Auditor Environment]
        AE[Audit Engine<br/>Forensic Analysis]
    end

    subgraph Storage_Layer [Data Persistence]
        CR[(Content Registry<br/>Metadata/Public Params)]
        CS[(Content Store<br/>Encrypted Blobs)]
    end

    CC[Content Creator] --> CP
    CC --> KMS
    CP --> CS
    CP --> CR
    
    KMS -- "Identity-Bound Keys" --> RC
    CS -- "Encrypted Payload" --> RC
    RC -- "Fingerprinted Plaintext" --> MP
    
    AE -- "Trace Request" --> CR
    FA[Forensic Auditor] --> AE
    AE -- "Analyze Leak" --> LEAK[Leaked Content]

    style Client_Side fill:#e1f5fe,stroke:#01579b
    style Creator_Infrastructure fill:#fff3e0,stroke:#ef6c00
    style Audit_Environment fill:#f1f8e9,stroke:#33691e

Container Responsibilities

• Key Management Service (KMS): Manages the Lattice-based Master Secret. Generates user-specific keys using Identity-Based Encryption (IBE).
• Content Packager: Performs the initial encryption. It maps the media into the transform domain (DCT/MDCT) and applies Functional Encryption (FE) parameters.
• Recipient Client Library: The core decryption engine. It implements “Emergent Fingerprinting,” where the decryption process itself introduces identity-bound perturbations.
• Audit Engine: Implements the Traitor Tracing (TT) algorithms to extract Boneh-Shaw codes or lattice-based watermarks from leaked media.

3. Component Diagram (C4 Level 3): Recipient Client Library

This diagram details the internal components of the Recipient Client, where the “Emergent Fingerprinting” occurs.

graph LR
    subgraph Recipient_Client_Library
        direction TB
        K_IN[Key Ingestor]
        LDE[Lattice Decryption Engine]
        TDP[Transform Domain Processor]
        FIM[Fingerprint Injection Module]
        OUT[Media Streamer]

        K_IN --> LDE
        LDE --> FIM
        TDP --> FIM
        FIM --> OUT
    end

    SK[User Secret Key] --> K_IN
    CIPHER[Encrypted Content] --> TDP
    OUT --> PLAY[Media Buffer]

    subgraph Logic [Internal Logic]
        direction LR
        LDE -- "LWE Error Term" --> FIM
        TDP -- "DCT Coefficients" --> FIM
    end

Component Descriptions

• Lattice Decryption Engine: Handles the Learning With Errors (LWE) based decryption. The specific error-correction path is determined by the user’s unique key.
• Transform Domain Processor: Decodes the encrypted media into its frequency domain representation (e.g., Discrete Cosine Transform).
• Fingerprint Injection Module: The “Emergent” core. It combines the unique noise vector derived from the decryption key with the DCT coefficients, ensuring the output is uniquely fingerprinted.

4. Deployment Diagram

SACDP is designed for a hybrid deployment: Creator-controlled key issuance and decentralized content delivery.

graph TB
    subgraph User_Device [User Device / Edge]
        subgraph TEE [Trusted Execution Environment]
            SDK[SACDP Decryption SDK]
            KS[Secure Key Store]
        end
        APP[Streaming App]
    end

    subgraph Cloud_Provider [Creator Cloud - AWS/GCP]
        subgraph K8s_Cluster
            KMS_POD[KMS Service]
            AUTH[Auth Service]
        end
        DB[(Key/Identity Mapping)]
    end

    subgraph P2P_Network [Decentralized Storage]
        IPFS[IPFS Nodes]
        CDN[Edge Cache]
    end

    SDK -- "Fetch Key" --> KMS_POD
    KMS_POD -- "Verify" --> AUTH
    SDK -- "Fetch Content" --> CDN
    CDN -- "Sync" --> IPFS
    SDK -- "Decrypted Stream" --> APP

5. Technology Stack Summary

6. Architecture Decision Records (ADRs)

ADR-001: Selection of Lattice-Based Cryptography

• Context: Traditional RSA/ECC are vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm. SACDP requires long-term content protection.
• Decision: Use Learning With Errors (LWE) as the primary cryptographic primitive.
• Consequences:
  • Provides Post-Quantum Security (PQS).
  • Larger key sizes compared to ECC.
  • Enables Functional Encryption (FE) required for emergent fingerprinting.

ADR-002: Emergent Fingerprinting via Transform-Domain Perturbation

• Context: Traditional watermarking is applied before encryption or after decryption, creating a “cleartext window” vulnerability.
• Decision: Integrate fingerprinting into the decryption process itself. The decryption key $SK_u$ is mathematically designed to produce a slightly perturbed version of the plaintext.
• Consequences:
  • No cleartext ever exists without a fingerprint.
  • High computational overhead during decryption (mitigated by WASM/SIMD).
  • Requires tight integration between the codec and the crypto-engine.

ADR-003: Non-Delegatable Leaf-Only Keys

• Context: Users often share keys to bypass DRM.
• Decision: Implement a Traitor Tracing (TT) scheme where any sub-key derived from a master user key still carries the original user’s identity.
• Consequences:
  • Discourages key sharing through technical accountability.
  • Increases the complexity of the Key Management Service.

7. Traceability Matrix

Data Model & ERD

Data Model Documentation: Sovereign Accountable Content Distribution Protocol (SACDP)

This document outlines the data architecture for the SACDP, focusing on the persistence of cryptographic identities, lattice-based key material, and the forensic metadata required for emergent fingerprinting and traitor tracing.

1. Entity-Relationship Diagram

The following diagram illustrates the relationships between the core cryptographic entities and the distribution management system.

erDiagram
    IDENTITY ||--o{ DECRYPTION_KEY : "possesses"
    IDENTITY ||--o{ CONTENT_METADATA : "owns/creates"
    
    CONTENT_METADATA ||--|{ CIPHERTEXT_PACKAGE : "is encrypted as"
    
    DECRYPTION_KEY ||--o{ ACCESS_GRANT : "authorized by"
    CIPHERTEXT_PACKAGE ||--o{ ACCESS_GRANT : "governed by"
    
    CIPHERTEXT_PACKAGE ||--o{ AUDIT_LOG : "generates"
    IDENTITY ||--o{ AUDIT_LOG : "triggers"
    
    AUDIT_LOG ||--o{ FORENSIC_REPORT : "informs"
    FORENSIC_REPORT }|--|| IDENTITY : "identifies"

    IDENTITY {
        uuid id PK
        string public_identity_hash UK
        bytea ibe_public_params "Lattice LWE Params"
        datetime created_at
    }

    DECRYPTION_KEY {
        uuid id PK
        uuid identity_id FK
        bytea secret_key_share "Short Vector (LWE)"
        int traitor_tracing_index "Boneh-Shaw Code Pos"
        boolean is_revoked
    }

    CONTENT_METADATA {
        uuid id PK
        uuid creator_id FK
        string title
        string mime_type
        jsonb signal_characteristics "DCT/MDCT Coefficients"
    }

    CIPHERTEXT_PACKAGE {
        uuid id PK
        uuid content_id FK
        bytea encrypted_payload "LWE Ciphertext"
        bytea fingerprint_mask "Transform Domain Perturbations"
        string protocol_version
    }

    ACCESS_GRANT {
        uuid id PK
        uuid key_id FK
        uuid package_id FK
        datetime expires_at
        string usage_constraints "Functional Encryption Policy"
    }

    AUDIT_LOG {
        uuid id PK
        uuid actor_id FK
        string action_type "DECRYPT | DOWNLOAD | LEAK_DETECTED"
        jsonb context_data
        datetime timestamp
    }

    FORENSIC_REPORT {
        uuid id PK
        uuid suspected_identity_id FK
        float confidence_score
        bytea extracted_fingerprint
        text analysis_summary
    }

2. Entity Descriptions

2.1 Identity

• Purpose: Represents a unique entity (Creator or Recipient) within the decentralized ecosystem. It serves as the anchor for Identity-Based Encryption (IBE).
• Attributes:
  • public_identity_hash: A SHA-3 hash of the user’s decentralized identifier (DID).
  • ibe_public_params: The public parameters for the lattice-based scheme (e.g., Matrix A in $As + e$).
• Relationships: One Identity can hold multiple Decryption Keys (for different devices/roles) and own multiple Content items.

2.2 Decryption Key

• Purpose: A non-delegatable, leaf-only cryptographic key used to decrypt content. It contains the specific “perturbation logic” for emergent fingerprinting.
• Attributes:
  • secret_key_share: The actual lattice-based secret (short vector).
  • traitor_tracing_index: The specific index assigned within the Boneh-Shaw codebook to enable forensic identification.
• Performance: Indexed by identity_id to allow rapid revocation checks during the decryption handshake.

2.3 Content Metadata

• Purpose: Stores the non-encrypted attributes of the media and the signal-domain characteristics required for fingerprinting.
• Attributes:
  • signal_characteristics: Metadata describing the DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) or MDCT blocks where perturbations can be safely injected without perceptual loss.

2.4 Ciphertext Package

• Purpose: The encrypted payload distributed to recipients.
• Attributes:
  • encrypted_payload: The media data encrypted using Lattice-based Functional Encryption.
  • fingerprint_mask: A template that defines how the decryption key should perturb the signal during the transformation from ciphertext to plaintext.

3. Data Dictionary

4. Data Flow Diagram

The following diagram illustrates how data moves from the Creator to the Recipient and eventually to the Auditor in the event of a leak.

graph LR
    subgraph "Content Creation"
        A[Raw Media] --> B[Signal Analyzer]
        B --> C[Content Metadata]
        C --> D[Lattice Encryptor]
    end

    subgraph "Distribution"
        D --> E{Ciphertext Package}
        E --> F[IPFS / Decentralized Storage]
    end

    subgraph "Consumption (Leaf Node)"
        F --> G[Decryption Engine]
        H[Decryption Key] --> G
        G --> I[Emergent Fingerprinting]
        I --> J[Fingerprinted Plaintext]
    end

    subgraph "Forensics"
        J -- "Unauthorized Leak" --> K[Forensic Auditor]
        K --> L[Signal Extraction]
        L --> M[Traitor Tracing Algorithm]
        M --> N[Identified Identity]
    end

5. Data Validation Rules

6. Data Migration Considerations

6.1 Legacy DRM Transition

• Mapping: Existing User IDs from legacy systems (e.g., Widevine Client IDs) must be mapped to SACDP Identities via a one-time cryptographic binding ceremony.
• Re-encryption: Content currently stored in AES-CTR (standard for Common Encryption) must be re-encrypted into Lattice-based Functional Encryption. This is a high-compute task and should be performed in batches.

6.2 Key Rotation

• Post-Quantum Readiness: As lattice parameters evolve (e.g., moving from Kyber-512 to Kyber-1024), the data model supports versioning via the protocol_version field in the Ciphertext_Package.
• Backward Compatibility: The system must maintain ibe_public_params for older content cycles to ensure long-term access for existing purchasers.

6.3 Scalability of Forensic Data

• Storage: Forensic reports and extracted fingerprints can grow significantly. It is recommended to store extracted_fingerprint blobs in cold storage (S3/Glacier) while keeping the Forensic_Report metadata in the primary relational database.

Flow Diagrams

SACDP System Interaction & Flow Documentation

This document outlines the critical operational flows of the Sovereign Accountable Content Distribution Protocol (SACDP). It details the interactions between Content Creators, Recipients, and Forensic Auditors, focusing on the cryptographic lifecycle of identity-bound content.

1. Sequence Diagrams: Critical User Journeys

UC-101: Content Preparation and Identity-Bound Key Issuance

This journey describes how a Content Creator initializes the system and issues a non-delegatable decryption key to a Recipient.

sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant CC as Content Creator (PKG)
    participant R as Recipient (Leaf Node)
    participant DS as Distribution Storage (IPFS/CDN)

    Note over CC: Generate Master Secret Key (MSK)<br/>& Public Parameters (PP)
    CC->>CC: Encrypt Content (LWE-based IBE)
    CC->>DS: Upload Encrypted Content (C)
    
    R->>CC: Request Access (Identity Proof + Public Key)
    CC->>CC: Verify Identity
    CC->>CC: Generate Leaf Key (sk_id)<br/>using Boneh-Shaw Code Embedding
    
    CC-->>R: Secure Delivery of sk_id & PP
    R->>DS: Fetch Encrypted Content (C)
    Note over R: Ready for Decryption

UC-102: Decryption with Emergent Fingerprinting

The core innovation where the decryption process itself introduces identity-bound perturbations into the media signal.

sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant R as Recipient (Leaf Node)
    participant KM as Key Manager (Hardware/TEE)
    participant SP as Signal Processor (DCT/MDCT)
    participant V as Media Viewer

    R->>KM: Load sk_id & Ciphertext (C)
    KM->>KM: Functional Encryption Decryption
    Note right of KM: Decryption math includes<br/>LWE noise + ID-specific delta
    
    KM->>SP: Stream Perturbed Coefficients (m')
    SP->>SP: Inverse DCT Transform
    SP->>V: Render Media (Perceptually Transparent)
    
    Note over V: Content is now uniquely<br/>fingerprinted for this Recipient

UC-103: Forensic Audit (Traitor Tracing)

The process of identifying the source of a leaked plaintext file.

sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant FA as Forensic Auditor
    participant L as Leaked Content (Plaintext)
    participant CC as Content Creator (Database)

    FA->>L: Extract Transform-Domain Perturbations
    FA->>FA: Map Perturbations to Boneh-Shaw Code
    FA->>CC: Query Identity Mapping (Code -> ID)
    CC-->>FA: Return Recipient Identity
    FA->>FA: Generate Cryptographic Proof of Leakage

2. Activity Diagrams: Complex Business Processes

AC-201: Content Preparation Pipeline

This diagram illustrates the transformation of raw media into a cryptographically secured, traceable format.

graph TD
    Start([Raw Media Input]) --> DCT[Apply DCT/MDCT Transform]
    DCT --> Quant[Quantization & Coefficient Selection]
    
    subgraph Encryption_Engine [Lattice-Based Encryption Engine]
        Quant --> FE[Functional Encryption Setup]
        FE --> LWE[LWE Ciphertext Generation]
    end
    
    LWE --> Pack[Package with Public Parameters]
    Pack --> Distribute([Distribute to CDN])
    
    subgraph Identity_Binding [Identity Binding]
        ID[Recipient ID] --> BS[Generate Boneh-Shaw Code]
        BS --> KeyGen[Generate Identity-Bound Key]
    end
    
    KeyGen -.->|Used during decryption| FE

3. State Diagrams: Entity Lifecycles

ST-301: Decryption Key Lifecycle

Decryption keys in SACDP are non-delegatable and tied to a specific leaf node.

stateDiagram-v2
    [*] --> Requested: User Identity Verified
    Requested --> Issued: MSK signs Identity
    Issued --> Active: Key Installed in TEE
    
    state Active {
        [*] --> Idle
        Idle --> Decrypting: Content Streamed
        Decrypting --> Idle: Stream End
    }
    
    Active --> Compromised: Forensic Match Found
    Active --> Revoked: Subscription Expired
    
    Compromised --> Blacklisted: Permanent Ban
    Revoked --> Requested: Renewal Process
    
    Blacklisted --> [*]

ST-302: Content Object State

The lifecycle of a content asset from creation to forensic analysis.

stateDiagram-v2
    [*] --> Raw: Creator Input
    Raw --> Encrypted: LWE Transformation
    Encrypted --> Distributed: Uploaded to CDN
    
    Distributed --> Leaked: Unauthorized Plaintext Found
    Leaked --> Auditing: Forensic Extraction
    Auditing --> Traced: Identity Identified
    
    Traced --> LegalAction: Evidence Generated
    LegalAction --> [*]

4. Integration Flow Diagram

IF-401: System Component Interaction

Shows the data flow between the decentralized storage, the creator’s key authority, and the recipient’s local environment.

graph LR
    subgraph Creator_Domain [Creator Infrastructure]
        KA[Key Authority / PKG]
        DB[(Identity Database)]
    end

    subgraph Storage_Network [Decentralized Storage]
        IPFS[IPFS / Filecoin]
    end

    subgraph Recipient_Node [Recipient Environment]
        TEE[Trusted Execution Environment]
        APP[Media Player]
    end

    KA <--> DB
    KA -- "sk_id (Encrypted)" --> TEE
    KA -- "Ciphertext" --> IPFS
    IPFS -- "Encrypted Stream" --> TEE
    TEE -- "Fingerprinted Plaintext" --> APP
    
    subgraph Auditor_Domain [Auditor Environment]
        Audit[Forensic Tool]
    end
    
    APP -.->|Unauthorized Leak| Audit
    Audit -- "Trace Request" --> KA

5. Error Handling Flows

EH-501: Decryption Failure & Noise Management

Lattice-based cryptography (LWE) relies on noise management. This flow handles decryption errors or key mismatches.

graph TD
    Start[Initiate Decryption] --> KeyCheck{Key Valid?}
    KeyCheck -->|No| Err1[Error: Invalid Identity Key]
    
    KeyCheck -->|Yes| NoiseCheck{LWE Noise < Threshold?}
    NoiseCheck -->|No| Err2[Error: Ciphertext Corruption]
    
    NoiseCheck -->|Yes| Decrypt[Execute Functional Decryption]
    Decrypt --> FPCheck{Fingerprint Embedded?}
    
    FPCheck -->|No| Err3[Error: Integrity Violation]
    FPCheck -->|Yes| Success[Output Media Stream]
    
    Err1 --> Log[Log Security Event]
    Err2 --> Retry[Request Block Retransmission]
    Err3 --> Halt[Halt System & Alert Creator]

Traceability Matrix (Flows to Requirements)

Test Plan

Test Plan Documentation: Sovereign Accountable Content Distribution Protocol (SACDP)

1. Test Strategy Overview

1.1 Testing Objectives

The primary objective of the SACDP test suite is to validate the cryptographic integrity, forensic accountability, and performance of the decentralized distribution framework.

• Cryptographic Correctness: Ensure Lattice-based IBE and FE implementations adhere to theoretical security bounds (LWE/SVP).
• Forensic Accuracy: Verify that the “Emergent Fingerprinting” mechanism uniquely identifies the decryption key used, even after signal manipulation.
• Collusion Resistance: Confirm that multiple users cannot combine keys or content to produce a “clean” version that evades tracing.
• Perceptual Transparency: Ensure that the fingerprinting process does not degrade media quality beyond acceptable thresholds (PSNR/SSIM).

1.2 Testing Scope

• In-Scope:
  • Lattice-based key generation and derivation.
  • Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) and Functional Encryption (FE) workflows.
  • Transform-domain (DCT/MDCT) perturbation injection during decryption.
  • Forensic Auditor tracing algorithms and Boneh-Shaw code extraction.
  • Post-quantum parameter validation.
• Out-of-Scope:
  • Network-layer transport protocols (TCP/UDP/IPFS).
  • End-user UI/UX design.
  • Payment gateway integrations.

1.3 Testing Approach

A Risk-Based Testing approach will be used, prioritizing the cryptographic core and forensic tracing.

• White-Box: Verification of lattice parameter distributions and noise growth.
• Black-Box: Testing the protocol from the perspective of a Content Creator and Recipient.
• Adversarial: Simulating “Traitor” scenarios where recipients attempt to strip fingerprints or share keys.

1.4 Entry/Exit Criteria

| Phase | Entry Criteria | Exit Criteria | | :— | :— | :— | | Unit Testing | Cryptographic primitives implemented. | 100% pass rate on math/logic tests; 90% code coverage. | | Integration | Successful key issuance and encryption. | Successful decryption with verifiable fingerprint injection. | | System Testing | Integrated Auditor and Creator modules. | Tracing accuracy > 99% for single-source leaks. | | Acceptance | System testing complete; documentation ready. | Stakeholder sign-off on perceptual quality and security. |

2. Test Levels

2.1 Unit Testing

• Focus: Mathematical foundations (LWE samples, Matrix multiplications, Polynomial rings).
• Frameworks: Google Test (C++), pytest (Python wrapper for crypto libs).
• Coverage Target: 95% for the crypto_core module.

2.2 Integration Testing

• Focus: The interface between the Cryptographic Engine and the Signal Processing Engine.
• Key Scenarios:
  • Key-to-Perturbation mapping.
  • Ciphertext-to-DCT block alignment.
  • Auditor-to-Database lookup for identity resolution.

2.3 System Testing

• Focus: End-to-End (E2E) lifecycle.
• Scenario: Creator encrypts a 4K video stream -> Recipient A decrypts -> Recipient A leaks a frame -> Auditor identifies Recipient A.

2.4 Acceptance Testing (UAT)

• Criteria:
  • Decryption latency < 200ms for standard hardware.
  • Media SSIM (Structural Similarity Index) > 0.98.
  • Non-delegatability: Attempting to extract a sub-key results in an unusable functional key.

3. Test Case Catalog

4. Test Coverage Matrix

graph LR
    subgraph Requirements
        FR1[FR-001: IBE Key Gen]
        FR2[FR-002: Encryption]
        FR3[FR-003: Fingerprinting]
        FR4[FR-004: Tracing]
        FR5[FR-005: Collusion]
    end
    
    subgraph Test_Cases
        TC1[TC-001]
        TC2[TC-002]
        TC3[TC-003]
        TC4[TC-004]
        TC5[TC-005]
        TC6[TC-006]
    end

    FR1 --> TC1
    FR1 --> TC6
    FR2 --> TC2
    FR3 --> TC3
    FR4 --> TC4
    FR5 --> TC5
    
    style FR3 fill:#f96,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
    style TC3 fill:#f96,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

5. Non-Functional Test Cases

5.1 Performance Testing

• Scenario P-001: Measure decryption overhead on ARM-based mobile processors vs. x86_64.
• Scenario P-002: Scalability of the Auditor tracing algorithm as the user base grows from $10^3$ to $10^6$.

5.2 Security Testing

• Scenario S-001 (Quantum Stress): Validate lattice parameters against the latest “Sieve” algorithms for SVP (Shortest Vector Problem) to ensure 128-bit post-quantum security.
• Scenario S-002 (Signal Attack): Apply heavy compression (H.265), cropping, and noise to decrypted content; verify if the fingerprint survives (Robustness Test).

5.3 Usability Testing

• Scenario U-001: Double-blind visual test where users compare original vs. fingerprinted content to ensure no perceptible artifacts.

6. Test Environment Requirements

6.1 Hardware

• Development Workstations: 32GB RAM, 8-core CPU (for lattice math simulations).
• Testing Nodes: Variety of devices (Android, iOS, Linux, Windows) to test decryption performance.

6.2 Software & Tools

• Languages: C++20 (Core), Python 3.10 (Testing/Scripting).
• Libraries: PALISADE or OpenFHE (Lattice Crypto), FFmpeg (Signal processing).
• Analysis: MATLAB or SciPy for SSIM/PSNR and signal perturbation analysis.

6.3 Test Data

• Media Samples: 4K Video (HEVC), High-fidelity Audio (FLAC), and RAW images.
• Identity Sets: Synthetic identity database of 10,000 unique nodes.

7. Test Schedule

gantt
    title SACDP Testing Timeline
    dateFormat  YYYY-MM-DD
    section Unit Testing
    Lattice Primitives       :active, ut1, 2026-03-01, 14d
    IBE/FE Logic             :ut2, after ut1, 10d
    section Integration
    Signal/Crypto Bridge     :it1, 2026-03-20, 15d
    Key Management API       :it2, after it1, 7d
    section System/Forensic
    E2E Distribution Flow    :st1, 2026-04-10, 14d
    Adversarial/Collusion    :st2, after st1, 14d
    section Acceptance
    Perceptual Quality Audit :at1, 2026-05-10, 7d
    Final Security Review    :at2, after at1, 7d

8. Risk Assessment

End of Test Plan Documentation

Phase Plan

Development Phase Planning: Sovereign Accountable Content Distribution Protocol (SACDP)

This document outlines the strategic roadmap for the development and deployment of the SACDP. The plan emphasizes the rigorous cryptographic implementation of lattice-based primitives and the novel integration of signal-processing-based emergent fingerprinting.

1. Project Timeline Overview

gantt
    title SACDP Development Roadmap (2024-2025)
    dateFormat  YYYY-MM-DD
    axisFormat  %b %d
    
    section Phase 1: Foundation
    Lattice Crypto Research & Selection :a1, 2024-01-01, 3w
    Architecture & Formal Specs        :a2, after a1, 2w
    
    section Phase 2: Core Protocol
    IBE & FE Implementation            :b1, 2024-02-05, 4w
    Traitor Tracing Logic (Boneh-Shaw) :b2, after b1, 3w
    
    section Phase 3: Signal Processing
    DCT/MDCT Transform Integration     :c1, 2024-03-25, 3w
    Emergent Fingerprinting Engine     :c2, after c1, 3w
    
    section Phase 4: Integration
    Forensic Auditor Tooling           :d1, 2024-05-06, 3w
    Distribution API & SDK             :d2, after d1, 3w
    
    section Phase 5: Validation
    Security Audit & Cryptanalysis     :e1, 2024-06-17, 3w
    Performance Tuning & UAT           :e2, after e1, 2w
    Production Deployment              :e3, after e2, 1w

2. Phase Descriptions

Phase 1: Foundation & Cryptographic Research

• Duration: 5 Weeks
• Objectives: Establish the mathematical baseline for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and finalize the system architecture.
• Deliverables: Cryptographic Specification Document, Lattice Parameter Selection Report, System Architecture Design.
• Key Activities: Selecting LWE (Learning With Errors) parameters, defining the IBE identity mapping, and setting up the development environment with PQC libraries (e.g., Open Quantum Safe).
• Dependencies: None.
• Success Criteria: Approval of the formal security model by the lead cryptographer.
• Risks: Parameter selection may lead to inefficient ciphertext sizes. Mitigation: Benchmarking multiple lattice dimensions early.

Phase 2: Core Protocol Development

• Duration: 7 Weeks
• Objectives: Implement the primary cryptographic primitives for identity-bound decryption.
• Deliverables: IBE Module, Functional Encryption (FE) Prototype, Traitor Tracing (TT) Key Generator.
• Key Activities: Implementing the Boneh-Shaw code structures, developing the non-delegatable key derivation function.
• Dependencies: Phase 1 Architecture.
• Success Criteria: Successful decryption of a test payload using a leaf-node key without group-key exposure.
• Risks: High computational overhead for FE. Mitigation: Implementing optimized vector-matrix multiplication in C++/Rust.

Phase 3: Emergent Fingerprinting & Signal Processing

• Duration: 6 Weeks
• Objectives: Integrate the decryption process with transform-domain perturbations.
• Deliverables: Modified Decryption Engine, Signal Perturbation Library (DCT/MDCT).
• Key Activities: Mapping cryptographic key bits to transform-domain coefficients, ensuring perceptual transparency of the resulting media.
• Dependencies: Phase 2 Core Protocol.
• Success Criteria: Decrypted content contains unique, traceable artifacts that are invisible to the human eye (PSNR > 40dB).
• Risks: Fingerprint erasure via transcoding. Mitigation: Utilizing robust spread-spectrum embedding techniques within the FE logic.

Phase 4: Integration & Tooling

• Duration: 6 Weeks
• Objectives: Build the ecosystem around the core protocol for creators and auditors.
• Deliverables: Forensic Auditor Dashboard, Content Creator CLI, Recipient SDK.
• Key Activities: Developing the tracing algorithm to extract identities from leaked content, building RESTful APIs for key issuance.
• Dependencies: Phase 3 Signal Processing.
• Success Criteria: Auditor can identify a “traitor” from a 30-second leaked clip with >99% accuracy.

Phase 5: Validation & Launch

• Duration: 6 Weeks
• Objectives: Ensure production readiness and security compliance.
• Deliverables: Security Audit Report, Performance Benchmarks, Production Build.
• Key Activities: Red-team collusion attacks, stress testing the key issuance server, UAT with content creators.
• Dependencies: All previous phases.
• Success Criteria: Zero critical vulnerabilities found in the cryptographic implementation.

3. Milestone Schedule

4. Resource Allocation

5. Sprint Planning Overview (Core Dev: 8 Sprints)

6. Release Plan

v0.1 Alpha (Internal)

• Date: Week 12
• Features: Basic IBE decryption, CLI-based key generation.
• Criteria: Functional end-to-end encryption/decryption flow.

v0.5 Beta (Developer Preview)

• Date: Week 18
• Features: Emergent fingerprinting, Forensic Auditor prototype, SDK for C++/Rust.
• Criteria: Successful tracing of single-source leaks.

v1.0 GA (Production)

• Date: Week 26
• Features: Full collusion resistance, Web/Mobile SDKs, Auditor Dashboard, PQC-hardened.
• Criteria: Passed external security audit; 99.9% tracing accuracy.

7. Risk Timeline

gantt
    title Risk & Mitigation Windows
    dateFormat  W
    axisFormat  Week %H
    
    section Cryptographic Risk
    Lattice Parameter Vulnerability :crit, 1, 5
    Mitigation: Peer Review & Benchmarking :active, 3, 3
    
    section Implementation Risk
    FE Performance Bottlenecks :crit, 8, 12
    Mitigation: SIMD Optimization/GPU Accel :active, 10, 4
    
    section Signal Risk
    Fingerprint Erasure (Transcoding) :crit, 14, 18
    Mitigation: Robustness Testing & Tuning :active, 16, 4
    
    section Security Risk
    Collusion Attack Vulnerability :crit, 18, 22
    Mitigation: Red-Team Testing & Code Refinement :active, 20, 4

Key Risk Mitigation Strategy:

• Weeks 1-5: Focus on mathematical soundness to prevent foundational failures.
• Weeks 10-14: Focus on computational efficiency to ensure the protocol is usable on consumer hardware.
• Weeks 20-24: Focus on adversarial resilience (collusion and signal manipulation).

Project Data

Generated JSON file: design.project_data.json

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{
  "project_name" : "Sovereign Accountable Content Distribution Protocol (SACDP)",
  "description" : "A decentralized cryptographic framework for secure content distribution that replaces traditional platform-based DRM with a model of cryptographic ownership and forensic accountability. The system utilizes Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), Traitor Tracing (TT), and Functional Encryption (FE) built on lattice-based post-quantum primitives. A key innovation is 'Emergent Fingerprinting,' where the decryption process itself introduces identity-bound, transform-domain perturbations into the media signal, ensuring that any leaked plaintext can be traced back to the specific decryption key used.",
  "created_date" : "2026-02-24T17:32:37.965242553",
  "epics" : [ {
    "id" : "EPIC-UC",
    "name" : "User Features",
    "description" : "Core user-facing functionality based on use cases",
    "priority" : "High",
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    "story_points" : 80
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    "id" : "EPIC-ARCH",
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    "description" : "Set up system architecture and infrastructure",
    "priority" : "High",
    "status" : "Planned",
    "story_points" : 21
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    "id" : "EPIC-TEST",
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    "description" : "Testing and quality assurance activities",
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    "story_points" : 13
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    "story_points" : 13
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  "releases" : [ {
    "id" : "REL-1",
    "name" : "MVP Release",
    "version" : "1.0.0",
    "target_date" : "2026-04-21",
    "description" : "Minimum Viable Product release with core functionality",
    "epic_ids" : [ "EPIC-UC", "EPIC-ARCH", "EPIC-TEST", "EPIC-101" ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  }, {
    "id" : "REL-2",
    "name" : "Feature Complete Release",
    "version" : "1.1.0",
    "target_date" : "2026-06-16",
    "description" : "Full feature release with all planned functionality",
    "epic_ids" : [ "EPIC-UC", "EPIC-ARCH", "EPIC-TEST", "EPIC-101", "EPIC-102", "EPIC-103", "EPIC-104", "EPIC-105", "EPIC-106" ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  } ],
  "sprints" : [ {
    "id" : "SPRINT-1",
    "name" : "Sprint 1",
    "number" : 1,
    "start_date" : "2026-02-24",
    "end_date" : "2026-03-10",
    "goals" : [ "Complete sprint 1 deliverables" ],
    "capacity_points" : 40,
    "task_ids" : [ "TASK-101", "TASK-102", "TASK-103", "TASK-301" ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  }, {
    "id" : "SPRINT-2",
    "name" : "Sprint 2",
    "number" : 2,
    "start_date" : "2026-03-10",
    "end_date" : "2026-03-24",
    "goals" : [ "Complete sprint 2 deliverables" ],
    "capacity_points" : 40,
    "task_ids" : [ "TASK-302", "TASK-303", "TASK-401", "TASK-402" ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  }, {
    "id" : "SPRINT-3",
    "name" : "Sprint 3",
    "number" : 3,
    "start_date" : "2026-03-24",
    "end_date" : "2026-04-07",
    "goals" : [ "Complete sprint 3 deliverables" ],
    "capacity_points" : 40,
    "task_ids" : [ "TASK-201", "TASK-202", "TASK-304", "TASK-403" ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  }, {
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    "name" : "Sprint 4",
    "number" : 4,
    "start_date" : "2026-04-07",
    "end_date" : "2026-04-21",
    "goals" : [ "Complete sprint 4 deliverables" ],
    "capacity_points" : 40,
    "task_ids" : [ "TASK-404", "TASK-501", "TASK-502", "TASK-601" ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  }, {
    "id" : "SPRINT-5",
    "name" : "Sprint 5",
    "number" : 5,
    "start_date" : "2026-04-21",
    "end_date" : "2026-05-05",
    "goals" : [ "Complete sprint 5 deliverables" ],
    "capacity_points" : 40,
    "task_ids" : [ "TASK-602" ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  }, {
    "id" : "SPRINT-6",
    "name" : "Sprint 6",
    "number" : 6,
    "start_date" : "2026-05-05",
    "end_date" : "2026-05-19",
    "goals" : [ "Complete sprint 6 deliverables" ],
    "capacity_points" : 40,
    "task_ids" : [ ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  }, {
    "id" : "SPRINT-7",
    "name" : "Sprint 7",
    "number" : 7,
    "start_date" : "2026-05-19",
    "end_date" : "2026-06-02",
    "goals" : [ "Complete sprint 7 deliverables" ],
    "capacity_points" : 40,
    "task_ids" : [ ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  }, {
    "id" : "SPRINT-8",
    "name" : "Sprint 8",
    "number" : 8,
    "start_date" : "2026-06-02",
    "end_date" : "2026-06-16",
    "goals" : [ "Complete sprint 8 deliverables" ],
    "capacity_points" : 40,
    "task_ids" : [ ],
    "status" : "Planned"
  } ],
  "tasks" : [ {
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    "type" : "task",
    "epic_id" : "EPIC-UC",
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    "story_points" : 3,
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    "acceptance_criteria" : [ "Task completed successfully" ],
    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "epic_id" : "EPIC-UC",
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    "priority" : "Medium",
    "story_points" : 3,
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    "acceptance_criteria" : [ "Task completed successfully" ],
    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "epic_id" : "EPIC-UC",
    "sprint_id" : "SPRINT-1",
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    "story_points" : 3,
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    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-302",
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    "id" : "TASK-303",
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    "description" : "Auto-extracted task from analysis",
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    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-401",
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    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-402",
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    "epic_id" : "EPIC-UC",
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    "acceptance_criteria" : [ "Task completed successfully" ],
    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-201",
    "title" : "Task TASK-201",
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    "type" : "task",
    "epic_id" : "EPIC-UC",
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    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-202",
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    "epic_id" : "EPIC-UC",
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    "acceptance_criteria" : [ "Task completed successfully" ],
    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-304",
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    "type" : "task",
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    "acceptance_criteria" : [ "Task completed successfully" ],
    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-403",
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    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-404",
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    "type" : "task",
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    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-501",
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    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-502",
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    "type" : "task",
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    "acceptance_criteria" : [ "Task completed successfully" ],
    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-601",
    "title" : "Task TASK-601",
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    "type" : "task",
    "epic_id" : "EPIC-UC",
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    "acceptance_criteria" : [ "Task completed successfully" ],
    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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    "id" : "TASK-602",
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    "type" : "task",
    "epic_id" : "EPIC-UC",
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    "acceptance_criteria" : [ "Task completed successfully" ],
    "labels" : [ "auto-generated" ]
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  "milestones" : [ {
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    "id" : "MS-3",
    "name" : "Fingerprint Beta**",
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    "id" : "MS-4",
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  }, {
    "id" : "MS-5",
    "name" : "Production Release**",
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    "deliverables" : [ "Phase 5 deliverables complete" ],
    "status" : "Planned"
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    "dependency_type" : "blocks"
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    "id" : "DEP-3",
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    "target_type" : "task",
    "dependency_type" : "blocks"
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    "id" : "DEP-4",
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    "target_type" : "epic",
    "dependency_type" : "relates_to"
  }, {
    "id" : "DEP-5",
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}